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Student, IWU (Class of '94)
presented for Senior Research Honors
I. INTRODUCTION

The European Conununity, (EC), is moving closer and closer to
full economic integration.

There is general agreement that the

economic integration of these countries will have major sectoral
and national impacts.
banking sector.

One sector that will be affected is the

The banking sector, or the financial sector in

general, is extremely important; the efficiency of that sector,
in its role as intermediary, is crucial to the efficiency of the
economy as a wnole.
The integration of banking systems among the EC countries
is necessary in order to achieve the goals of European economic
union, which include the complete free movement of all factors of
production: goods, people, services, and capital.

Integration of

banking in the European Conununity entails the harmonization and

..

centralization of regulations, or restrictions.

The first step

taken, which went into effect in January of 1993, was to make
banks free to move anywhere within the Conununity, creating a
larger market in which they must compete.
Competition, due to banks being free to move within the
Conununity, will eventually result in regulation converging near
the least amount of current regulatory interference.

After

integration, banks are free to branch anywhere they want within

•

2

the EC, and they abide by the regulations of their home country.
Therefore, banks from countries with minimal regulation will have
an advantage unless countries with strict regulation of banking
lessen restrictions in order to compete.
this argument.

Swary and Topf express

They say that "bank regulation within the EC

seems virtually certain to converge on a low level of operative
interference, and a concomitantly low regulatory burden." (1992,
p. 445)
The purpose of this research is to examine profits in the
banking sectors of each of the,EC countries before integration,
and from there to infer what may happen to profits after
integration.

This is because it is too soon to have data on and

to see the effects of the integration of the banking systems,
since the laws governing the integration just came into effect in
January of 1993.
Theoretically, profit is related to the risks banks are
allowed to assume and to the activities in which they are allowed
to engage, which are dependent upon the regulatory environment in
which banks operate.

After integration of the financial markets

in the EC, there will be a low level of regulatory interference.
Those countries whose banks have previous experience operating in
an atmosphere of little regulatory interference may have certain
competitive advantages in the new market, Which I will explain
later.
II. THEORY/BACKGROUND/LITERATURE

Banking Regulations and Bank Profits
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Regulations in the banking industry restrict the operations
or activities of a bank.

They affect the profits of a bank or a

banking system by restricting its opportunity to achieve cost
reductions through economies of scale and scope.

Different

levels of regulation lead to different opportunities for
economies of scale and scope, and therefore different profits,
all other factors being constant.
A firm eRjoys economies of scale when expanding its size
decreases its unit costs.

A firm enjoys economies of scope when

expanding its range of activities decreases its unit costs.
In terms of the banking sector, increasing size means increasing
its assets, which are its loans, and its liabilities, which are
its deposits. ; Economies of scope in banking occur when banks are
allowed to expand their financial activities.

"For example, if a

bank has invested in acquiring information about a corporation in
order to make it a loan, it can use that same information, at no
extra cost, to underwrite a bond issue or to write an insurance
policy." (Kohn, 1991, p. 498)

If regulations restrict a bank

from attaining a large size or from engaging in a diverse range
of activities, they affect its ability to achieve economies of
scale and scope.

Cost reductions attained through economies of

scale and scope lead to higher profits, assuming all other
factors remain constant.
There are many examples of regulations which would limit
banks' abilities to achieve economies of scale and scope.
Stringent reserve or capital requirements would limit banks in
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that they limit the amount of risk banks are allowed to bear.
If a bank must keep its capital level high, it cannot diversify
its activities as much as it might like.

Restrictions on banks'

participating in the insurance industry or on their underwriting
securities would limit banks' opportunities to achieve economies
of scope because they restrict banks from providing a wide
variety of services.
Legal Environment and Harmonization of Regulations
When the EC was created by the Treaty of Rome in 1957, the
free trade of services was envisioned.

Until the Single European

Act (SEA), however, which came into effect in July of 1987, no
real attempt had been made to bring banking into the confines of
EC

legislation~

(Chrystal, 1992, p. 63)

.The Single European Act

provided for the completion of the common market and targeted the
end of 1992 for the complete free movement of goods, people,
services, and capital.

(Keys, 1989, p. 591)

The Second

Coordinating Banking Directive (2BD) was adopted in 1989 in order
to facilitate the integration of European banking systems.
Under the 2BD, banks operating in the EC have the right to move
wherever they want within the EC; they have a "single passport."
(Economist, 1992, p. 29)

A license to operate a bank in one EC

country must be accepted in all other EC countries if the bank
chooses to expand; banks may not be discriminated against on the
basis of nationality.

The 2BD sets forth a list of activities

permissible to banks, and if banks are allowed to engage in these
activities in their home countries, they are allowed to engage in
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these activities, by branching, throughout the EC.
The 2BD is accompanied by the Own Funds Directive and the
Solvency Ratio Directive, both also of 1989.

These directives

define equity capital and set minimum capital requirements.
Those countries whose capital requirements were not up to those
set by the EC will be at a disadvantage initially as they build
up their capital.
Implications .
Much has been written about the integration of the European
financial markets, as outlined ,by the 2BD.

The common theme in

the literature is the increase in competition brought about by
the larger market.
Keys (1989) foresees greater convergence of national laws
regarding banking in the EC, based on the concept of mutual
recognition.

Mutual recognition requires each country to

recognize the laws, regulations, and supervisory practices
governing banking in other EC countries as equivalent to its own
in allowing their banks to operate within its boundaries and be
under home country control.

(Keys, 1989, p. 602)

In order to

recognize the laws of another country as equivalent to its own,
there must be agreement on key issues.
harmonized.

From initial harmonization of regulations, market

forces will lead to even greater
602)

Key regulations must be

harmonization~

(Keys, 1989, p.

Countries will harmonize their regulations to avoid any

country having a competitive advantage as a result of its
regulations.

As stated earlier, Swary and Topf believe that
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convergence will occur at a low level of regulatory interference.
(1992, p. 445)
Chrystal and Coughlin (1992), Swary and Topf (1992), and
Krause (1973), are all concerned with the efficiency of the
financial system and the increased efficiency resulting from the
integration of financial systems in the EC.

Competition will

increase in the new, larger market, thereby increasing
efficiency.

Banks will not be able to earn monopoly profit; they

will have to charge a competitive, lower price for their
services.

Swary and Topf estimate that overall, prices in the

banking sector in the EC could decrease by 21% as a result of
integration. (1992, p. 441) In order to be profitable in the new
environment, banks will have to take

adva~tage

of cost-reduction

opportunities.
Vives argues that competition will increase with an
integrated European financial system, but that there are certain
barriers that prevent the attainment of perfect competition.
Some examples of these barriers are the costs faced by consumers
of switching banks and the effect having an established
reputation has on a bank's ability to compete. (1991, pp. 20-21)
He argues that barriers and other factors segment the banking
market, and predicts that the market will remain segmented, and
therefore the benefits of integration and increased competition
will be unevenly distributed.

(Vives, 1991, pp. 22)

This means

that countries' banks which have already been successful in
branching out into markets in other EC countries will also be in
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the best position to compete in the new integrated market.

They

will have gained experience operating in the markets which they
will be allowed freer access to.
An

integrated European financial system is likely to be more

competitive.

A greater number of firms in the market increases

the supply, and therefore decreases the price of their services.
However, a larger market provides opportunities to decrease costs
through economies of scale and scope.

Those countries whose

banks are better able tq take advantage of opportunities for
scale and scope will be more pEofitable in a market where prices
of their services have decreased.
Banks that have not had a lot of restrictions placed on them
in the past shbuld be in the best

positio~

to take advantage of

the economies of scope offered by integration.

They have

experience in handling a diverse range of activities and their
associated risks.

Banks that are fairly large and have a strong

market base at home should be in the best position to take
advantage of the economies of scale offered by integration;
otherwise they might be "swallowed up" by banks who have the
resources to expand by acquiring smaller institutions.
What often impedes banks from reaching a certain size or engaging
in a wide range of activities are the regulations that they face.
Banks and banking systems which have not been heavily regulated
before integration should enjoy advantages in the market for
financial services after integration.
III.

EMPIRICAL MODEL
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Since data are not available on profits after integration, I
look at profits before integration.

From the analysis of past

profits in the banking sector in the EC countries before
integration, I expect to draw some conclusions about the possible
effects of integration on profits.

My goal is to test whether

profits before integration were related to the amount of
regulation facing banks.

Specifically, I expect that those banks

which were less regulated should have been more profitable.

If

this is true, then certain countries' banks should have a
competitive advantage after integration, because they have
experience operating in an atmosphere of few restrictions and
should be better able to take advantage of economies of scale and
scope offered in the larger market.
The tool that I use to explain profits in the banking
systems in the EC before integration is OLS (ordinary least
squares) regression analysis with data both across countries and
across time.

The data come from the consolidated banking system

income statements and balance sheets for 11 of the 12 EC
countries, for the years 1985 through 1989.

(OECD, 1991)

Data

are not available for Ireland, therefore it is not included in
the study.
Variables regressed against bank profitability are related
to the amount of regulation facing banks • . The dependent variable
in my model is return on equity (ROE), which is a measure of
profit divided by equity.

I used after-tax profits, because

after-tax returns are the relevant variable in decision making.
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The six independent variables discussed below are listed in
Table I on page 10.
RESERVES- Reserves are obtained from the balance sheets of the
banking systems.

I use a ratio of reserves to total assets.

Reserves are cash on hand and do not earn money like loans do; if
a bank is required to hold more reserves, it is unable to make as
many loans.

If a country has stringent reserve requirements, its

banks should be less profitable.

The sign for RESERVES should be

negative.
INCOME-

This variable measures total non-interest income of the

banking system for a given year (from the consolidated income
statement) divided by the total income of the system (also from
the consolidated income statement).

This is a measure of the

diversity of activities of the system.

The more income that

banks earn that is not due to interest charges (i.e. the
traditional making of loans), the more diverse is their range of
activities.

An example of non-interest income would be charges

for underwriting securities.

The sign for INCOME should be

positive, since as banking systems become more diverse (non
interest income rises), profit is expected to rise.

Profit

should rise because expanding diversity of activities leads to
economies of scope, which reduce costs.
GOP- GOP growth is used as a means of capturing fluctuations in
profits due to the overall state of the economy.

I lag GOP

growth by one year, meaning that GOP growth in a country in one
year does not affect that countries' banking system profits until

10
TABLE I:

Summary of explanatory variables

variable

a measure of:

RESERVES

amount of risk

expected sign

-

banks are allowed
to assume
(NON-INTEREST)

diversity of

INCOME

activities

.

.

fluctuations due to

GDP (growth)

+

+

business cycle
diversity of

INSREG

-

activities
size (economies of

ASSETS

+

scale)
amount of risk

CAPITAL

-

banks are allowed

...
UKLOANLOSS

to assume
provisions for LDC

-

debt
DENMARK

economic
circumstances and·
loan-losses

-
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the next year.

This makes sense as it would take some time for

people to start feeling very optimistic about the economy.

The

sign for GOP should be positive, since as GOP increases profits
in the banking sector should increase also.
INSREG- I use a dummy variable for whether or not a country
allows its banks to participate in the insurance industry
(according to OECO, 1992).

This variable is intended to serve as

a proxy for a}l restrictions on the range of products that banks
face.

The variable takes on a value of 1 if there are some

restrictions in the country regarding banks' participation in the
insurance industry and a value of 0 if there are none.

If banks

are allowed to participate in the insurance industry, their
profits should" be higher, due to economies of scope.

The sign

for INSREG should be negative, due to the way I set up the
variable.
ASSETS-

This variable is used as a measure of the average size

of banks in the banking system, and comes from the consolidated
balance sheets of the banking systems.

It is the total assets of

the consolidated banking system of a country for a given year,
divided by the number of banks.

The sign for this variable

should be positive, since profits should be expected to
increase as the average size of banks in the system increases.
Large banks have better opportunities for economies of scale.
CAPITAL- Capital is another word for equity.

I use a ratio of

capital over total assets, found in the balance sheets for each
countries' banks.

If a country has stringent capital (or equity)
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requirements in relation to assets for its banks, its banks
should be less able to be profitable, in terms of profit divided
by equity.

They are also less able to be profitable because

they are not allowed to take on as much risk; lending and other
opportunities are restricted.

Thus, the sign for CAPITAL should

be negative.
UKLOANLOSS- This is another dummy variable.
plotted

ove~ ~ime

When profits are

for the banking systems in each of the EC

countries, profits in tne UK are puzzling (see figures I and II).
In the years 1987 and 1989, profits fell to virtually nothing.
My research reveals that during those two years, banks in the UK
made huge provisions for LDC debt which was no longer good debt.
(Swary & Topf,' 1992, p. 169)

The UKLOANLOSS variable is set up

to take into account these provisions.

It has a value of 0 for

every country and every year except for the UK in the years 1987
and 1989.

This variable should have a negative sign, because

provisions for LDC debt caused profits to fall dramatically.
DENMARK- This is also a dummy variable, set up to take into
account special circumstances which affected profits in the
banking sector in Denmark (see figure I).
profits fell sharply.

Starting in 1986,

The Danish economy fell into a recession,

and banks started accumulating losses on domestic loans.
long recession since 1986 has not left banks unscathed.
loan loss provisions have in fact been high."

"The
Their

(Barnes, 1991)

Danish banks "survived a long economic recession and bad-debt
provisions mainly because they are better capitalised and more
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FIG.2:After-tax ROE- EC banking systems
Data source: DECO, Bank Profitability
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FIG.l:After-tax ROE-EC banking systems
Data source: DECO, Bank Profitability
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closely supervised."

(Economist, 1992, p. 84)

To account for

this economic crisis, the dummy variable is set up with a value
of 0 for every country and every year except Denmark for the
years 1986 through 1989, for which it has a value of 1.
IV. RESULTS

The results of the regression are given in Table II.
Overall, they are very good and seem to support the hypothesis
that fewer restrictions or regulations lead to greater
opportunities for profit.
The two variables that do 'not perform well are the variable
for GDP and the variable for capital.

The variable for GDP

growth (lagged one year) does not perform well in the sense that
it is not statistically significant.

No

~ignificant

relationship

can be implied between GDP growth and profits in the banking
sector.
The variable for the amount of capital kept by banks in the
banking systems of each of the EC countries is puzzling because
its positive sign is the opposite of what was predicted.
According to the model, banks which held more capital were more
profitable than banks which held less, while it was predicted
that banks which held less capital would be most profitable.
The rest of the variables turn out to be significant at the
.10 level and they all have the predicted signs.
The variable for reserves is negative and significant.
says that banking systems which held fewer reserves (or were
required to hold fewer reserves by regulation) were more

This
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TABLE II: REGRESSION RESULTS

VARIABLE

COEFFICIENT /

RESERVES

-0.1977

/

1. 9507*

INCOME

0.0016

/

4.9069*

GDP

0.0007

/

0.3105

INSREG

-0.0125

/

1.4165*

CAPITAL

0.3496

/

1.7108*

ASSETS

0.0003

/

2.1483*

UKLOANLOSS

-0.1472

/

6.4422*

DENMARK

-0.0618

/

3.9454*

T-STAT.

R2 (adjusted) ~ .63
*indicates significance at the .10 level or greater (with one
tailed test)
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profitable.

The variable for non-interest income is positive

and significant.

As banks expanded their range of activities

from the traditional loan-making (or were allowed to expand their
activities by regulation or the lack thereof), and therefore
earned more non-interest income, their profits increased.

They

were able to take advantage of economies of scope.
The variable for insurance industry participation is
negative and significant, as predicted.

Banking systems in those

countries which allowed their banks to participate in the
insurance industry were more profitable than those in countries
which restricted bank participation in the insurance industry.
Again, when they were allowed to participate in the insurance
industry, they were allowed to further take advantage of
economies of scope.
The variable for average assets of the banking systems is
positive and significant as predicted.

Those countries whose

banks had the highest average assets were the ones which were
most profitable.

They were able to take advantage of economies
~

of scale.

v.

CONCLUSIONS

As stated, the model is generally helpful in supporting the
hypothesis that fewer restrictions or regulations in the banking
sector leads to more profit.

Those countries whose banking

sectors were least heavily regulated, as measured by the
variables in the model, were the ones which were most profitable.
An important goal of this research was to infer, from past
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performance, which countries' banks would be most likely to be
successful, or profitable, after the integration of the banking
sectors in the EC.

In order to do this, I looked at the actual

profits in the banking sector for each country for each year and
compared these to the profits predicted by the model.

The actual

and predicted values, along with the error terms, are shown in
Table III.
The model predicted profitability well, as can be seen in
Table III, for the banking systems of:
Spain, and the UK.
sUbjective.

Belgium, France, Germany,

This definition of "well" is rather

What I did was to look at a graph of the predicted

and actual values; these five countries stood out as having the
least difference between actual and predicted profits.

These are

also banking systems which were relatively profitable.

If the

hypothesis holds that fewer restrictions facing banks, or the
ability to participate in a diverse range of activities, leads to
greater profitability, then these are the countries whose banking
systems should have been least restricted.
The two variables which measured diversity of activities
were the insurance participation variable and the non-interest
income variable.

Belgium, France, Germany, Spain, and the UK are

the countries which allow bank participation in the insurance
industry.

I calculated the average non-interest income of the

banking sectors of all countries, and then compared it with the
averages for each individual country.

The UK was well above the

average, Germany was close to the average, France and Spain were
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TABLE III: PREDICTED AND ACTUAL VALUES

COUNTRY

PREDICTED

ACTUAL

ERROR

Belgium

.06
.06
.06
.06
.05

.05
.06
.07
.07
.08

.004
.006
-.003
-.015
-.023

Denmark

.18
-.04
.02
.07
.02

.15
-.04
.02
.06
.03

.034
.000
.000
.008
.008

• 07
.08
.11
.11
.09

.06
.07
.07
.08
.08

.009
.017
.032
.035
.004

.07
.07
: .06
.06
.05

.07
.07
.07
.07
.08

-.004
-.005
-.016
-.009
-.029

Greece

.11
.17
.14
.08
.10

.11
.11
.13
.13
.13

.003
.054
.009
-.052
-.024

Italy

.07
.99
.07
.07
.10

.09
.10
.10
.10
.10

-.016
-.005
-.030
-.026
.002

Luxembourg

.05
.05
.05
.07
.06

.08
.08
.08
.08
.10

-.030
-.032
-.027
-.012
-.031

Netherlands

.13
.12
.13
.10
.10

.08
.08
.08
.09
.09

.052
.043
.044
.013
.006

.
France

Germany
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(TABLE III continued)
COUNTRY

PREDICTED

ACTUAL

ERROR

Portugal

.05
.04
.06
.07
.07

.07
.07
.07
.08
.06

-.020
-.033
-.014
-.011
.005

Spain

.08
.08
.09
.09
.10

.07
.07
.07
.08
.08

.011
.009
.022
.009
.028

• 13
.14
-.00
.16
.00

.13
.14
-.01
.15
.01

.003
.003
.007
.012
-.007

.
UK

...
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well over half of the average, but Belgium was less than half of
the average.

So it seems that as measured by the insurance

participation variable, those countries which the model predicted
well for were less restricted, and as measured by the noninterest income variable they were, for the most part, not the
least restricted countries, but nonetheless fairly unrestricted.
Given that the countries named above: had strong financial
systems, were'the ones which were least restricted as measured by
the insurance industry participation variable, and were fairly
unrestricted as measured by the non-interest income variable, it
follows that they should be the ones whose banking systems have
the best chance of being profitable after integration, because
they have gained experience operating in an environment of few
restrictions.
There were some weaknesses with the variables.

For example,

the capital/asset ratio, used for the capital variable, is not a
risk-weighted ratio, because a weighted ratio could not be found
nor calculated from the data.

However, the capital requirements

set by the EC use risk-weighted ratios.

The problems with this

variable could also be due to the fact that during this time,
adjustments were being made in many of the countries to BIS (Bank
for International Settlements) capital standards.
The model does not account for cost differences due to
differences in deposit insurance schemes.

There are great

differences in deposit insurance protection across the EC
countries.

There has been much debate within the Community as to
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what to do about these differences.

A directive has been

proposed that would subject each EC country to a minimum ECU
15,000 of deposit insurance protection per depositor.

This is

below the protection currently offered in the UK, Denmark,
France, Italy, and Germany.

Portugal and Greece currently have

no protection, and Spain, Belgium, and Luxembourg would be
required to increase deposit protection to meet the ECU 15,000
minimum.

(BNA, 1992)

Costs due to different deposit insurance

schemes are· probably important costs that are missing from the
model.

Ideally, a variable would be included denoting the costs

to banks of deposit insurance, in other words the premiums that
they pay. If such costs could be uncovered in future research,
the model would be enhanced.
Another variable that is missing in the model is a variable
accounting for banks' expansion into markets in the EC.

If

a

banking system had already expanded into EC markets, its banks
would further increase their opportunities for economies of scale
and they would gain experience in operating in and establish a
reputation in these markets.

The extent of each banking system's

EC operations, for all the years studied, could not be found.
Again, if future research could find a measure for each systems'
EC operations, that would improve the model.
Certainly future research would also be affected by
developments in the establishment of a common European currency.
If the EC countries eventually adopt a common currency, their
banking sectors would be greatly affected.
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